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Abstract
This paper analyzes the structure of mixed-strategy equilibria for Colonel
Blotto games, where the outcome on each battlefield is a polynomial function
of the difference between the two players’ allocations. This paper severely
reduces the set of strategies that needs to be searched to find a Nash equi-
librium. It finds that there exists a Nash equilibrium where both players’
mixed strategies are discrete distributions, and it places an upper bound on
the number of points in the supports of these discrete distributions.
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1 Introduction
Colonel Blotto is a two-player game, whose prototypical version has two
colonels fighting a battle with each other on multiple fronts. In an economics
context, the colonels might be, for instance, two firms competing simultane-
ously in multiple geographical areas, or two political candidates seeking to
“win” as many places as possible. Each colonel has only a fixed number of
troops (or resources) to distribute among the fronts, and whichever colonel
assigns more troops on a front wins that front. Both colonels want to win
as many fronts as possible. If one colonel knew how the other would arrange
the troops, then this colonel would simply arrange to win all but one front
by just one soldier. Thus, each colonel must follow a mixed strategy; that
is, deciding at random how to arrange the troops. Of course, it matters just
from which distribution is that randomly-determined pure strategy.
This paper studies Blotto on two battlefields where the outcome on a
battlefield depends continuously on the advantage in allocations on that bat-
tlefield, a topic that has received scant attention to date. The motivation for
this is that outnumbering one’s opponent by one soldier does not guarantee
victory. Having one more soldier is an advantage, but the battle might still
go the other way. The bigger the advantage, the more likely the bigger army
is to win. Thus, it is reasonable to have probability of winning be a contin-
uous function of the two numbers of troops (instead of the function used in
the classical Blotto game: 1 for the player with the bigger allocation, 0 for
the other player). The goal is to maximize the expected value of the number
of battlefields won. As expectation is a linear function, the probabilities of
winning each battlefield can be re-interpreted as expected numbers of battle-
fields won. For example, a 57% chance of winning would mean an expected
value of 0.57 battlefields. This interpretation is all the more useful, because
it can also accommodate varying degrees of victory. After all, not all battles
are clear wins for one side or the other. It is also reasonable to subtract
0.5 from the function, so that a positive result on a battlefield represents
an expected victory (the bigger the positive result, the bigger or more likely
the victory), and a negative result, correspondingly, represents an expected
defeat. Thus, an expected result of 0.57 battlefields becomes an expected
result of 0.07 battlefields better than equality on that battlefield. This sub-
traction in effect turns a constant-sum game into a zero-sum game. This
expected result can be written as a function of the difference of allocations
on the battlefield, and this function can be called the outcome function.
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If the two players had equal resources, then, at least if the outcome func-
tion were an odd function, then this game would have a simple solution: both
players can play any strategy at all, and the result will be zero. Any gain
on one battlefield would be compensated by a loss of equal size on the other
battlefield. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce some unfairness into the
game, either by allowing the outcome function not to be odd, or by giving
one player an advantage in resources. The model of this paper accommodates
both approaches.
It is already known that a game like this has a Nash equilibrium; Glicks-
berg’s theorem [7] guarantees it. This paper shows that if the outcome func-
tion is polynomial, then, not only is there a Nash equilibrium, but there is
one where both players choose from only a small number of pure strategies.
Actually finding an equilibrium exactly is a difficult matter.
This type of game can model two firms simultaneously competing on
two markets, where one firm happens to be larger. It can also model two
political parties competing in two districts (by spending campaign money) if
(for instance) the number of seats for a party in a district is proportional to
the vote percentage for that party in that district, something that classical
win/loss Blotto cannot do. It can model winner-take-all rules also, because
there is no guarantee of winning a district just by outspending the opponent.
It is true that the exact outcome function is unlikely to be a polynomial,
but it can be approximated by a polynomial fit through several points. The
more points the polynomial goes through, the closer the result is to the Nash
equilibrium, but the harder it is to evaluate the game.
In a zero-sum game, a Nash equilibrium represents perfect strategies for
both players, in the sense that each player’s strategy (if played as in the
equilibrium) guarantees that player at least the equilibrium result. Those two
combined guarantees rule out the possibility of either player seeking a better
result - since the opponent’s equilibrium strategy renders that impossible
regardless of what the player may do. To the extent that a (zero-sum) Colonel
Blotto game reflects an economic competition correctly, a Nash equilibrium
to it gives perfect strategies for both players. Normally, with a continuous
range of options, a Nash equilibrium looks like a continuous distribution,
and all together, these constitute an infinite-dimensional space. This paper
shows that a specific class of continuous Blotto games are exceptions to this,
by having Nash equilibria that can be obtained by searching only a finite-
dimensional space of strategies, each of which has a simple form.
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The general approach that this paper uses is a series of reductions and
transformations of the set of mixed strategies, which are repsesented as
probability-density functions. First, any pure strategy of either player is
represented by just a single number, x for Player 1, and y for Player 2.
(Let Player 1 be the player with a resource advantage if there is one.) The
payoff-matrix (call it E) based on this number has infinitely-many rows and
columns (Player 1 choosing the row and Player 2 choosing the column).
However, of those infinitely-many columns (or rows), only N + 1 (where
N is the degree of the outcome function) are linearly independent, essentially
because the columns are polynomials of degree at most N in x, Player 1’s
choice of pure strategy. This means that E maps the space of all functions
to a finite-dimensional space. So, there is only an (N + 1)-dimensional space
of functions g (probability-density functions for Player 2’s strategies) where
all the Eg are distinct. Thus, if g˜ is another function, then Eg˜ = Eg. But,
if f is the probability-density function of Player 1’s mixed strategy (and g
is the same for Player 2), then the expected result is fTEg 1. If Eg = Eg˜,
then fTEg = fTEg˜ regardless of what f is, so every strategy for Player 2
is payoff equivalent to one of the gs in the (N + 1)-dimensional space. This
works just as well if the two players are reversed.
In other words, there is an (N + 1)-dimensional space of equivalence
classes of strategies (for either player), where any two strategies in the same
equivalence class are payoff equivalent. Each of these equivalence classes can
be described as an (N +1)-dimensional vector. That is true for both players.
What is more, the function that reduces the probability-density function
of a strategy to the vector of the strategy’s equivalence class can be made
to be linear. Therefore, it preserves convex combinations2. Thus, the vec-
tors of all the equivalence classes are convex combinations of the vectors
of the equivalence classes of the pure strategies. The equivalence classes
of the pure strategies form a curve in (N + 1)-dimensional space. How-
ever, Carathe´odory’s Theorem says that each convex combination of points
in (N + 1)-dimensional space can be described as a convex combination of
at most N + 2 of the points. This means that every equivalence class that
contains any strategies contains one that is a convex combination of only
finitely many (at most N + 2) pure strategies, or, equivalently, contains a
1T stands for transpose, and this multiplication should be interpreted as if it were a
usual matrix multiplication, with an integral replacing the summation.
2A convex combination is a weighted average with nonnegative weights; here, the
weights are the probability-density function of the mixed strategy.
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discrete distribution with at most N + 2 components3. Wherever any Nash-
equilibrium strategy may be, its equivalence class contains a strategy with
this type of discrete distribution, which is payoff equivalent to the Nash-
equilibrium strategy (and thus is a Nash-equilibrium strategy too).
Finding Nash equilibria for Blotto games is the topic of many papers,
each tasked with covering a specific variation of the conditions, the first one
to propose the problem being Borel, in [5] (translated into English as [6]).
Things that were varied include the aim of the players (maximizing expected
value or the probability of winning a majority), whether the allocations can
be varied discretely or continuously, the number of battlefields fought on,
the numbers of troops each colonel has access to (and whether one colonel
has more troops than the other), the relative values of the fronts (where the
aim is to maximize the total value won), whether the game is zero-sum or
not, and even the nature of the resource constraints. These include Wein-
stein’s [20], Hart’s [10], Gross and Wagner’s [9], Roberson and Kvasov’s [17],
Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer’s [11], Schwartz, Loiseau, and Sastry’s
[18], Thomas’s [19], Kovenock and Roberson’s [12], and Macdonell and Mas-
tronardi’s [13]. Macdonell and Mastronardi’s paper has a similar result to
this paper, in that it also has two battlefields with unequal resources, and a
set of Nash equilibria that always includes a discrete distribution.
This paper explores yet another dimension of Blotto, where the result
depends on the degree of victory. Even this form of Blotto was explored,
although not as much as traditional win/loss Blotto. Unfortunately, these
papers only search for pure strategies, and if there is none, the only conclusion
that can be drawn from using the methods of those papers is exactly that:
”No pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists”. One example is Blackett’s [4],
which only has a necessary condition for the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. Blackett allows for any outcome function. Golman and
Page’s [8] has a one-parameter family of outcome functions, and allows many
battlefields and dependencies between battlefield outcomes, but Golman and
Page find that in most of the cases they study, pure-strategy equilibria do not
exist. Oso´rio’s [16] does succeed in finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,
but that paper restricts itself to a narrow class of outcome functions. This
paper is a complement to the pure-strategy searches, in that it serves as a
bound on how ”impure” are the strategies that need to be considered. Mixed-
strategy equilibria for this form of Blotto have been explored in [15], but that
paper limits its outcome function to a finite-parameter set.
3A component of a discrete-distribution mixed strategy is one of the pure strategies
that are played with positive probability, according to the mixed strategy.
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The convex optimization method of Bellman’s [3] is not applicable here,
because of its assumption (in terms of the language of this paper) that, for
all battlefields, the outcome function is concave down in Player 1’s allocation
and concave up in Player 2’s allocation. When the outcome function is a
function of the difference of allocations (as here), this assumption is almost
always incorrect4.
However, a simpler version of the method of Beale and Heselden’s [1],
which is also a simpler version of the algorithm in Behnezhad, Dehghani,
Derakhshan, HajiAghayi, and Seddighin’s [2], is applicable here. Player 1
takes an integer L (the larger L, the better the approximation, but the longer
it will take to calculate), and treats both players’ possible allocations as if
they were required to be integer multiple of n+a
L
. Then, Player 1 considers
the probabilities of playing each strategy as variables, adds an extra variable
for the payoff, and sets up inequalities to reflect that the probabilities must
be nonnegative and sum to 1, and that the expected payoff against any of
Player 2’s strategies be no lower than the payoff variable. Player 1 seeks to
maximize the payoff variable subject to these inequalities, and uses a linear
programming model to do this. This has the drawback of possibly produc-
ing increasingly complicated equilibrium strategies as L goes up, which are
proven here not to be necessary in the case of a polynomial outcome function.
The knowledge that there exist Nash-equilibrium strategies that are dis-
crete distributions, with an upper bound on the number of components,
makes it easier to search for a Nash-equilibrium, analytically or numerically.
One possible approach for this is to group each player’s possible mixed strate-
gies by the number of components, and by which ”edge” strategies5, if any,
were used as components. Then, in each group, the parameters that the
player has control of are: which pure strategies are the components, and
all but one of the probabilities of playing the components6. For each pair
of groups (one group for each player), the critical points of the payoff can
be found by setting the partial derivatives of the payoff with respect to all
parameters (for both players) to zero and solving the resulting system of
4The outcome function can be written as P (x˜− y˜) (where x˜ and y˜ are the two players’
allocations), and ∂
2
∂x˜2
[P (x˜− y˜)] and ∂2
∂y˜2
[P (x˜− y˜)] both equal P ′′ (x˜− y˜), so the concavity
of the outcome function is the same with respect to both players’ allocations.
5An edge strategy is a pure strategy that is at a boundary of the pure-strategy space;
here, this would mean placing all resources on one battlefield or the other.
6The probability of playing the remaining component is determined by the fact that
the probabilities have a sum of 1, and so, it is not a parameter.
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polynomial equations.7 8 The Nash equilibrium is one of the critical points,
and a point can be checked for being a Nash equilibrium by checking that
neither player can improve the result by changing to a pure strategy.
For efficiency, the critical points from the lowest-parameter groups should
be checked first, before the systems for the higher-parameter groups get
solved, as these are the groups that yield the simplest systems of equations.
There are also ways to make this algorithm faster, by reducing the upper
bound on the number of pure-strategy components that could be required.
The extensions concern themselves primarily with this. One of the exten-
sions takes advantage of the symmetry between the two battlefields, while
another one uses the theorem proven in [14] to take advantage of the conti-
nuity of the pure strategies. Together, these extensions make a brute-force
approach (described in the extensions) feasible in practice for low degrees of
the polynomial as the outcome function.
2 Model
A two-field continuous Blotto game is defined by an ordered triple (n, a, r),
where n is Player 2’s resources, a is Player 1’s advantage in resources, and r
is the outcome function. That is, Player 1’s resources are n+a, and Player 1
chooses a number x˜ ∈ [0, n+ a]. Player 2 chooses a number y˜ ∈ [0, n]. These
numbers are called allocations to battlefield 1. The allocation to battlefield 2
is n+a− x˜ for Player 1 and n− y˜ for Player 2. Thus, each player’s allocations
sum to that player’s resources.
On each battlefield, the outcome is r (z), where z is the difference in
allocations between Player 1 and Player 2 on that battlefield. That is, z =
x˜− y˜ on battlefield 1 and z = a− x˜+ y˜ on battlefield 2.
Player 1’s payoff is r (x˜− y˜) + r (a− x˜+ y˜), and correspondingly, Player
2’s payoff is the opposite, which −r (x˜− y˜) − r (a− x˜+ y˜), which makes
continuous Blotto a zero-sum game. Player 1 seeks to maximize the expected
value of Player 1’s payoff, while Player 2 seeks to minimize the expected value
7If both players’ groups have zero parameters (like the group of one-component strate-
gies with an ”all-on-battlefield-2” component), then every point is critical.
8There are no special cases for boundary extrema (from the point of view of one player),
because these are already accounted for by being in a different group, either one with fewer
components, or one using more ”edge” strategies.
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of Player 1’s payoff.
The outcome function represents the dependence of the degree of victory
(or the probability of victory) on a battlefield on the advantage in resources
on that battlefield, where a battlefield could (for instance) mean a district
in an election, or one of two markets over which two firms simultaneously
compete.
3 Main result
Theorem. In any continuous Blotto game where r is a polynomial, there
exists a (mixed-strategy) Nash-equilibrium, in which both players’ strategies
are distributions with support on at most N +2 points, where N is the degree
of r.
It was already known that this game would have a Nash equilibrium; the
new result is that there exists one with this form.
This theorem is proven by first establishing that, if r is a polynomial,
then the payoff matrix has rank not greater than N + 1. That allows a
change of coordinates that leaves both players with only an at most (N + 1)-
dimensional strategy space, each point in which corresponds to many mixed
strategies that are exactly equivalent to each other. In the new coordinates,
the mixed strategies still form the convex hull of the pure strategies, and that
makes each mixed strategy have a representation as the convex combination
of only at most N + 2 pure strategies. This equality in the new coordinates
corresponds to equivalence as mixed strategies. Wherever a Nash equilibrium
may be, both players can choose an equivalent strategy with only finitely
many components.
4 Method
The reduction of the strategy space to discrete distributions will be illustrated
with a relatively simple example, r (z) = −z3. It should be noted that when
actually applying this result, these steps are not needed; they only exist to
show that, in fact, there is a Nash equilibrium with a discrete distribution.
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4.1 Symmetrization of the Battlefields
The players’ possible strategies can equally well be written in terms of devia-
tions from the even-split strategy. That is, instead of choosing x˜, Player 1 can
be considered as choosing x, defined as x˜− n+a
2
, and similarly, Player 2 can be
considered as choosing y, defined as y˜− n
2
. From the fact that x˜ ∈ [0, n+ a],
it follows that x ∈ [−n+a
2
, n+2
2
]
, and from the fact that y˜ ∈ [0, n], it follows
that y ∈ [−n
2
, n
2
]
.
Player 1’s payoff, denoted by R (x, y), is r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(−x+ y + a
2
)
.
The proof of this is in Appendix 1, as the proof of Lemma 1. With r (z) =
−z3, R (x, y) = −6 (x− y)2 (a
2
) − 2 (a
2
)3
(as demonstrated in Calculation 1
in Appendix 2).
The goal of this change of variables is simply to treat the two battlefields
symmetrically. Another useful property is that either player exchanging allo-
cations to the two battlefields results in that player’s variable (x or y) simply
changing sign when written in this form (because, since Player 1’s allocations
add to n+a, subtracting n+a
2
from each allocation leaves 0 for Player 1’s new
sum, and similarly, since Player 2’s allocations add to n, subtracting n
2
from
each allocation leaves 0 for Player 2’s new sum).
Player 1’s resource advantage gives Player 1 two benefits, namely the
ability to have higher allocations and a wider range of strategies. This re-
mains true after the change in coordinates, except that the advantages are
decoupled from each other: the ability to have higher allocations is now in
the form of the function R, while the wider range of strategies still manifests
itself as a wider interval.
The addition of a constant to every payoff does not change which strate-
giy pairs are Nash equilibria, and neither does multiplying every payoff
by a positive constant. As such, if the payoff were − (x− y)2 instead of
−6 (x− y)2 (a
2
) − 2 (a
2
)3
, that would not change the location of the Nash
equilibria. Since the function − (x− y)2 is easier to manipulate, that shall
be used as the example for R (x, y) in the rest of this paper.
4.2 Expected Payoff as a Dot Product
Let Player 1 and Player 2 both play mixed strategies.
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Player 1’s mixed strategies are distributions of x, with support
[−n+a
2
, n+a
2
]
.
Let f (x) be the probability-density function of Player 1’s mixed strategy.
Similarly, Player 2’s mixed strategies are distributions of y with support[−n
2
, n
2
]
. Let g (y) be the probability-density function of Player 2’s mixed
strategy.
For functions fa and fb with domain
[−n+a
2
, n+a
2
]
, let fa·fb =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
fa (x) fb (x) dx.
For functions ga and gb with domain
[−n
2
, n
2
]
, let ga · gb =
n
2∫
−n
2
ga (y) gb (y)dy.
Let E be the linear transformation, from the functions with domain
[−n
2
, n
2
]
to the functions with domain
[−n+a
2
, n+a
2
]
, such thatEg =
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) g (y)dy.
Player 1’s expected payoff in this game is the weighted average of all the
possible results (with f (x) and g (y) being the weights), which is
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) f (x) g (y) dy dx,
can also be written as f · (Eg). (This is proven in Lemma 2 in Appendix 1.)
If R (x, y) = − (x− y)2, then:
f · (Eg) =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
(− (x− y)2) f (x) g (y) dy dx
4.3 Reduction of Dimensionality
One way to analyze a linear transformation is to find its matrix, given a
basis. This will be done with R (x, y) = − (x− y)2, and the basis used will
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be the orthonormal basis of polynomials
f0 (x) =
(√
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2
f1 (x) =
(√
3
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 3
2
x
f2 (x) =
(√
45
8
)(
n+ a
2
)− 5
2
x2 −
(√
5
8
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2
f3 (x) =
(√
175
8
)(
n+ a
2
)− 7
2
x3 −
(√
63
8
)(
n + a
2
)− 3
2
x
f4 (x) =
(√
11025
128
)(
n+ a
2
)− 9
2
x4 −
(√
2025
32
)(
n + a
2
)− 5
2
x2 +
(√
81
128
)(
n + a
2
)− 1
2
· · ·
for Player 1, and the orthonormal basis of polynomials
g0 (y) =
(√
1
2
)(n
2
)− 1
2
g1 (y) =
(√
3
2
)(n
2
)− 3
2
y
g2 (y) =
(√
45
8
)(n
2
)− 5
2
y2 −
(√
5
8
)(n
2
)− 1
2
g3 (y) =
(√
175
8
)(n
2
)− 7
2
y3 −
(√
63
8
)(n
2
)− 3
2
y
g4 (y) =
(√
11025
128
)(n
2
)− 9
2
y4 −
(√
2025
32
)(n
2
)− 5
2
y2 +
(√
81
128
)(n
2
)− 1
2
· · ·
for Player 2. (See Calculation 3 in Appendix 2 for the process of obtaining
it.)
Using this basis, f can be written as


f · f0
f · f1
f · f2
...

 and g can be written as
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

g · g0
g · g1
g · g2
...

. 9 As for the matrix of E, its entry in the i-th row and j-th column
should be the i-th component of Egj, but this is just fi · (Egj). Thus, it
follows that the matrix of E is

f0 · (Eg0) f0 · (Eg1) f0 · (Eg2) · · ·
f1 · (Eg0) f1 · (Eg1) f1 · (Eg2) · · ·
f2 · (Eg0) f2 · (Eg1) f2 · (Eg2) · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · ·


which means that f · (Eg) is


f · f0
f · f1
f · f2
...


T 

f0 · (Eg0) f0 · (Eg1) f0 · (Eg2) · · ·
f1 · (Eg0) f1 · (Eg1) f1 · (Eg2) · · ·
f2 · (Eg0) f2 · (Eg1) f2 · (Eg2) · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · ·




g · g0
g · g1
g · g2
...


where T indicates transpose. Using f ·(Eg) =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
(− (x− y)2) f (x) g (y) dy dx,
the matrix of E is

(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2 0 0 · · ·
0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 0 0 0 · · ·(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0 0 0 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·


Note the all-zero columns and rows. Calculation 2 shows that those and all
further columns and rows are, in fact, all zero.
The fact that only the top 3-by-3 corner of the matrix has any non-zero
entries means that f · (Eg) only depends on the first three rows and columns,
9This is true because f · fs is also the s-th component of f , as, if f =
∞∑
s=0
csfs for some
constants cs, then f · fs = f ·
∞∑
s=0
csfs =
∞∑
s=0
cs (f · fs), but as the fs are orthonormal, this
is just cs, which is the s-th component of f .
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and therefore, can be truncated to

f · f0f · f1
f · f2


T


(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2
0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 0(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0



g · g0g · g1
g · g2


The same is true in general. f · (Eg) still equals


f · f0
f · f1
f · f2
...


T 

f0 · (Eg0) f0 · (Eg1) f0 · (Eg2) · · ·
f1 · (Eg0) f1 · (Eg1) f1 · (Eg2) · · ·
f2 · (Eg0) f2 · (Eg1) f2 · (Eg2) · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · ·




g · g0
g · g1
g · g2
...


and this can be truncated to at most N +1 dimensions (rows and columns),
where N is the degree of r as a polynomial. (f0, f1, f2, · · · and g0, g1, g2, · · ·
are exactly the same orthonormal polynomials as they were in the R (x, y) =
− (x− y)2 case.) This statement is proven in Appendix 1 as Lemma 4.
Let the old coordinates refer to the coordinates where Player 1’s strategy
is represented by its probability-density function f , and Player 2’s strategy is
represented by its probability-density function g, and let the new coordinates
be


f · f0
f · f1
f · f2
· · ·
f · fN

 for Player 1 and


g · g0
g · g1
g · g2
· · ·
g · gN

 for Player 2, where N is the degree
of r as a polynomial.
4.4 Convex Hull
While the strategy space in the new coordinates is finite-dimensional if r is
a polynomial, its boundaries are rather difficult to find directly. However,
tools from convexity theory allow an easier description of the strategy space.
Every mixed strategy is a convex combination of pure strategies, in that
if g is a mixed strategy, then g (y) =
n
2∫
−n
2
δ (ty − y) g (ty) dty, where δ (ty − y)
is the Dirac delta function applied to ty − y, which is the probability density
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function of a random variable that always takes on the value ty. Since the
transformation to the new coordinates is linear, it follows that every mixed
strategy in the new coordinates is likewise a convex combination of the pure
strategies. In fact, the coefficients that show the mixed strategy is a convex
combination of the pure strategies are exactly the same as the coefficients
that do this in the old coordinates.
Thus, the convex hull of the pure streategies in the new coordinates con-
tains all the mixed strategies. If r is a polynomial of degree N , the pure
strategies are part of an (at most) N+1-dimensional space. Lemma 7 in Ap-
pendix 1 shows that every point in the convex hull of an N + 1-dimensional
set is a convex combination of at most N +2 points, so every mixed strategy
is a convex combination of N +2 or fewer strategies. This includes whatever
the Nash equilibrium is.
In the example with R (x, y) = (x− y)2, the strategies, in the new coor-
dinates, are

f · f0f · f1
f · f2

 for Player 1 and

g · g0g · g1
g · g2

 for Player 2.
The pure strategies are, in the new coordinates (as shown in Calculation
4 in Appendix 2),

(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 3
2x(√
45
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 5
2x2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2


for Player 1, and 

(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n
2
)− 3
2 y(√
45
8
) (
n
2
)− 5
2 y2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2


for Player 2. This can be viewed as a parametric representation of the curve
containing all pure strategies (in the new coordinates). The Nash equilibrium
strategies (for both players) must lie within the convex hull of this curve,
and Calculation 5 in Appendix 2 reduces the strategy space further, to a
one-dimensional one (and actually finds the Nash equilibrium from there,
although it may be easier to determine the strategy space in terms of the
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old coordinates, and then find the Nash equilibrium; after all, in the old
coordinates, these strategies have simple descriptions).
This is fewer than the 4 strategies (which imply a 7-parameter family
of strategies: 4 strategies, 4 coefficients, minus 1 for the coefficients always
summing to 1) allowed by Lemma 7 in Appendix 1 (and the overall theorem
allows 5 strategies, which give 9 parmaters). Moreover, in each individual
mixed strategy, the two strategies have fixed weights (1
2
each), so in fact,
one parameter suffices for naming each mixed strategy that could be a Nash
equilibrium. Are there always going to be fewer parameters describing the
space in which a Nash equilibrium must lie? The answer is yes, and some of
the extensions concern themselves with this.
5 Extensions
5.1 Reducing the Number of Components
5.1.1 Degree of R
R (x, y) = r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(−x+ y + a
2
)
. Therefore, R is an even function
of x−y, which means that its degree in x−y is even. Thus, if r (z) has degree
N where N is odd, then R (x, y) cannot have degree N . At most, R (x, y) has
degree N−1. That reduces the maximum number of components that might
be required to describe a Nash-equilibrium strategy by one if N is odd, so if
N is odd, there is a Nash-equilibrium strategy with only N + 1 components
(or fewer), rather than N + 2.
5.1.2 Removing the Odd Coordinates
The equivalence of the two battlefields means that only symmetrical strate-
gies need to be considered, where a symmetrical strategy is one that, for
whatever probability (or probability density) it assigns to a particular pure
strategy, it assigns the same probability (or probability density) to the same
strategy with the battlefields reversed. As exchanging allocations turns a
pure strategy x into pure strategy −x (or y into −y), if Player 1 exchanges
allocations in every pure strategy of which Player 1’s mixed strategy f (x) is
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composed, that turns Player 1’s strategy into f (−x). A similar allocation
exchange for Player 2 turns g (y) into g (−y). That makes any symmetrical
strategy be represented by an even function.
A strategy can be symmetrized by taking its even part, fe (x) =
f(x)+f(−x)
2
(or ge (y) =
g(y)+g(−y)
2
. Since this is a mixture of two mixed strategies with
coefficients adding to 1, it is likewise a mixed strategy. If one player plays a
symmetrical strategy, then the other player can symmetrize, without affect-
ing the result, because a symmetrical strategy is invariant to the opponent
exchanging allocations (and symmetrizing is mixing the original strategy with
the same strategy with exchanged allocations). If Player 1 playing strategy f
and Player 2 playing strategy g is a Nash equilibrium, then none of the steps
of the following cycle: Player 1 symmetrizing, then Player 2 symmetrizing,
then Player 1 removing the symmetrization, then Player 2 removing the sym-
metrization, improves Player 1’s payoff. That means that each step keeps
the payoff the same, so there is no effect on the payoff from both players
symmetrizing from a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if a deviation from fe
succeeded (in improving the result against the original, with Player 1 playing
strategy fe and Player 2 playing strategy ge) against ge, the symmetrization
of the deviation would succeed equally well, and the symmetrization would
also succeed against g, but that is impossible because Player 1 playing strat-
egy f and Player 2 playing strategy g is a Nash equilibrium. The deviation
does not succeed for Player 1, and a deviation by Player 2 would similarly not
succeed. Thus, if Player 1 playing strategy f and Player 2 playing strategy g
is a Nash equilibrium, so is Player 1 playing strategy fe and Player 2 playing
strategy ge. More details can be found in Lemma 12 in Appendix 1 and its
proof.
Lemma 10 in Appendix 1 confirms that f0, f1, f2, · · · and g0, g1, g2, · · ·
are all even or odd functions, and therefore, the new coordinates need only
include the components corresponding to even-function polynomials, which
are polynomials with only even powers, the components of an even function
corresponding to odd-function polynomials being zero. That reduces the
dimension of the mixed strategy space to N+2
2
(or to N+1
2
if N is odd), this
being the number of nonnegative even integers less than or equal to the
degree of R. As symmetrizing is a linear operator, these mixed strategies are
all and only the convex combinations of the symmetrized pure strategies. (A
symmetrized pure strategy at x, or y, is a mixed strategy of x and −x, or
correspondingly, y and −y, each with probability 1
2
.) That means that there
is a Nash-equilibrium strategy that is a convex combination of only N+4
2
(or
N+3
2
if N is odd) symmetrized pure strategies.
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In the new coordinates, the strategies were


f · f0
f · f1
f · f2
· · ·
f · fN

 for Player 1 and


g · g0
g · g1
g · g2
· · ·
g · gN

 for Player 2. This consideration reduces the strategy space to


f · f0
f · f2
f · f4
· · ·
f · f2⌊N
2
⌋

 for Player 1 and


g · g0
g · g2
g · g4
· · ·
g · g2⌊N
2
⌋

 for Player 2.10 11
5.1.3 Removing the 0-th Coordinate
When Carathe´odory’s Theorem was used, the dimension of the curve of pure
strategies equaled the number of parameters. However, this curve actually
has a dimension one lower than the number of parameters, because f ·f0 and
10The subscript of the last entry is N if N is even, or N − 1 if N is odd.
11The functions with the even subscripts are even, and the functions with the odd
subscripts are odd, because one term of fs as a polynomial in x is a nonzero multiple of
xs, and therefore, as fs was already shown to be even or odd, it must be even if x
s is even,
or odd if xs is odd. However, xs is even exactly when s is even, and xs is odd exactly
when s is odd.
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g · g0 are constants, and that is because
f · f0 =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) f0 (x) dx
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x)
((√
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2
)
dx
=
((√
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2
) n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) dx
=
(√
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2
(because
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) dx = 1), and similarly for g · g0. This reduces the true
dimension of either player’s strategy space by one.
5.1.4 Extending Carathe´odory’s Theorem
Another extension is to make use of the fact that the set of all pure strategies
is a polynomial curve. Carathe´odory’s Theorem assumes the worst-case sce-
nario, that is, that the points of which the convex hull is taken are discrete.
This is not the case here; the locations of the pure strategies can be varied
continuously, so, if the curve is M-dimensional, then, instead of the usual
M + 1 points on the curve being required to name any point in the convex
hull, only M+1
2
points are needed, as each component contributes 2 to the
dimension of the space of the strategies: 1 for the probability of playing this
pure strategy, plus 1 for the location of the pure strategy.12 That this is
indeed possible is shown as the corollary of the theorem in [14].
12A number of points that is a half-integer is to be interpreted as the next higher integer
number of points, with the first point fixed at its lowest possible value. This is “half a
point” in the sense that it only contributes 1 to the dimension of the space of the strategies,
instead of 2.
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5.1.5 The Total Effect
These dimension-reducing extensions are not mutually-exclusive; indeed, all
of them can be applied, in the order in which they were presented. After
the odd coordinates were removed, the strategy space became


f · f0
f · f2
f · f4
· · ·
f · f2⌊N
2
⌋


for Player 1 and


g · g0
g · g2
g · g4
· · ·
g · g2⌊N
2
⌋

 for Player 2, and after the 0-th coordinate was
removed, the strategy space became only ⌊N
2
⌋-dimensional, and the allowance
of 2 parameters per component means that only
⌊N
2
⌋+1
2
symmetrized pure
strategies are required. Thus, only N+2
4
if N is even, or N+1
4
if N is odd,
symmetrized pure strategies are required to find the Nash equilibrium.
This low number allows the use of an otherwise-infeasible brute-force al-
gorithm to find an approximate Nash equilibrium. First, find the payoff when
both players play symmetrized pure strategies, in terms of which symmetrized
pure strategies the players play. Then, restrict Player 1’s symmetrized pure
strategies to
{
0,
(n+a2 )
L
, 2
(n+a2 )
L
, · · · n+a
2
}
, for some integer L. Do the same for
Player 2, which gives the set
{
0,
(n2 )
L
, 2
(n2 )
L
, · · · n
2
}
. For (symmetrized) mixed
strategies, express them as convex combinations of symmetrized pure strate-
gies, and restrict the coefficients to the set of integer multiples of 1
L
(with
these coefficients still summing to 1). Then, for each mixed strategy13 of
Player 1, and for each symmetrized pure strategy of Player 2 (for both play-
ers, using the only pure strategies possible to be ones in the “restricted” set),
compute the expected payoff. For each mixed strategy of Player 1, choose
the lowest result obtained by Player 2’s pure strategies. Over all the mixed
strategies, the highest such minimum is the approxmate Nash-equilibrium
strategy for Player 1. Reverse the players (so now Player 2 selects a mixed
strategy, while Player 1 selects a symmetrized pure strategy) to get an ap-
13The only mixed strategies that are to be used here are those that are convex com-
binations of up to N+2
4
, if N is even, (or of up to N+1
4
, if N is odd) symmetrized pure
strategies.
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proximate Nash-equilibrium strategy for Player 2. A check on the accuracy
of this can be obtained by finding the best result either player can get by
playing any (not just one in the “restricted” set) pure strategy against the
other player’s claimed approximate Nash-equilibrium strategy.
5.2 Other Possible Extensions
The main result need not be limited to the class of games examined here; for
instance, it would also apply if the choices of allocations for both players were
discrete, or if the two battlefields did not have the same outcome function, or
if the outcome function (on either battlefield) were any polynomial of degree
N or less in both x and y (not just a polynomial of degree N or less in x−y),
or any combination of these. However, not all of these extensions apply in
all of these cases.
Polynomials are not the only kind of function that give a payoff matrix of
finite rank. This theorem might be modified to be applied to other functions
producing payoff matrices of finite rank, perhaps functions like P (z) sin (z)
or P (z) sinh (z), where P (z) is a polynomial.
With more than two batlefields, the strategy spaces still have an orthonor-
mal basis, this time of polynomials in several variables. Might a Blotto game
with the same polynomial outcome function on each battlefield also have a
Nash equilibrium with a discrete distribution? If so, how many components
does this discrete distribution have? Perhaps, the methods of this paper can
be used to answer these questions.
6 Conclusion
Modeling a competition using Blotto with a polynomial outcome function
has two advantages over modeling the same competition with Blotto where
the outcome on every battlefield is a win or a loss. One advantage is that
a polynomial is a better fit to the actual function than a staircase function,
especially if the staircase function is required to have its jump at zero (which
it should if we want to make the battlefield fair). This is even true if the bat-
tlefields actually do have a winner-take-all rule, because a resource advantage
does not guarantee victory.
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The other advantage is the existence of a Nash-equilibrium strategy that
is a discrete distribution with relatively few components. This leaves only a
finite-dimensional space of possible Nash equilibria, which can be searched
for saddle points. This is also a good reason to try to minimize the dimen-
sion of the space in which Nash equilibria exist, so that the objects on which
there is no small perturbation of strategy that improves the result are as
low-dimensional as possible; ideally, these should be points; hence the exten-
sions. Once such an equilibrium strategy is found, it is easy to implement
with a random-number generator. The same cannot be said about continu-
ous distributions in general, because simulating such a distribution requires
knowing how to invert the cumulative distribution function, and this inverse
might not have a convenient form.
7 Appendix 1: Lemmas
Lemma 1 (Effect of the shift of coordinates on the payoff). Player 1’s payoff
is r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(−x+ y + a
2
)
.
Proof. Player 1’s payoff is:
r (x˜− y˜) + r (a− x˜+ y˜)
= r
((
x+
n+ a
2
)
−
(
y +
n
2
))
+ r
(
a−
(
x+
n+ a
2
)
+
(
y +
n
2
))
= r
(
x+
n + a
2
− y − n
2
)
+ r
(
a− x− n+ a
2
+ y +
n
2
)
= r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
)
Lemma 2. Player 1’s expected payoff, which is
n
2∫
−n
2
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) f (x) g (y) dy dx,
equals f · (Eg).
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Proof. Player 1’s expected payoff can be simplified as follows:
n
2∫
−n
2
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) f (x) g (y) dy dx =
n
2∫
−n
2
f (x)
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) g (y) dy dx
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(f (x)) ((Eg) (x)) dx
= f · (Eg)
and thus equals f · (Eg).
Lemma 3. If g is a function, there is exactly one decomposition of g into
g|| + g⊥, such that g|| is a polynomial with degree at most M , and g⊥ is
orthogonal to all polynomials with degree at most M .
Proof sketch. Use Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to get an orthonormal
basis of the polynomials with degree at mostM . Then, project g to the space
of polynomials with degree at mostM , for instance by adding the projections
of g to the spaces of each individual vector of the basis. This is g||. What is
left is orthogonal to all polynomials with degree at most M .
This is the only decomposition; if there were two distinct ones, subtract
one from the other, which gives an alternative way to write 0: 0 = 0|| + 0⊥.
0|| = −0⊥, so 0|| is both a polynomial of degree at most M and orthogonal
to all polynomials of degree at most M , including itself. That makes 0|| = 0
and 0⊥ = 0, so there is no alternative decomposition.
Proof. As the polynomials with degree at mostM form an (M + 1)-dimensional
vector space, this vector space must have an orthonormal basis (which can be
constructed by the Gram-Schmidt process, starting from the non-orthonormal
basis
{
1, y, y2, ..., yM
}
). Let {b0, b1, b2, ..., bM} be this orthonormal basis.
Then, g|| =
M∑
t=0
((g · bt) bt), and g⊥ = g − g||. Indeed, for any bu with
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u ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...,M}:
bu · g⊥ = bu ·
(
g − g||
)
= bu ·
(
g −
(
M∑
t=0
((g · bt) bt)
))
= bu · g −
M∑
t=0
((g · bt) (bu · bt))
= bu · g − g · bu
= 0
(As {b0, b1, b2, ..., bM} is an orthonormal basis, all terms of
M∑
t=0
((g · bt) (bu · bt))
except for the term with t = u, and if t = u, then bt · bu = 1.)
The decomposition is unique, because if there were two decompositions
g = g||1 + g⊥1 = g||2 + g⊥2, then:(
g||1 + g⊥1
)− (g||2 + g⊥2) = 0(
g||1 − g||2
)
+ (g⊥1 − g⊥2) = 0(
g||1 − g||2
)
= − (g⊥1 − g⊥2)
However, this means that g||1 − g||2 is both a polynomial with degree at
most M , and is orthogonal to all polynomials with degree at most M . In
particular, this means that g||1 − g||2 is orthogonal to itself, and the only
polynomial that is orthogonal to itself is the zero polynomial. The same is
true of g⊥1 − g⊥2. Thus, g||1 = g||2 and g⊥1 = g⊥2, so the two decompositions
were the same.
Lemma 4 (Finite Rank of E). If r (z) is a polynomial function of z with
degree N , if f0, f1, · · · , fM are orthonormal and are all polynomials in x with
degree not greater than M , and if g0, g1, · · · , gM are orthonormal and are all
polynomials in y with degree not greater than M , then, for some M ≤ N ,
f · (Eg) can be expressed as
(
f · f0 f · f1 · · · f · fM
)


f0 · (Eg0) f0 · (Eg1) · · · f0 · (EgM)
f1 · (Eg0) f1 · (Eg1) · · · f1 · (EgM)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
fM · (Eg0) fM · (Eg1) · · · fM · (EgM)




g · g0
g · g1
· · ·
g · gM


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Proof sketch. Let M be the degree of R (x, y) as a polynomial in x − y.
Decompose f · (Eg) into f|| ·
(
Eg||
)
+ f⊥ ·
(
Eg||
)
+ f|| · (Eg⊥) + f⊥ · (Eg⊥).
The last two terms are zero, because R (x, y) is a polynomial of degree M in
both x and y, and at each x, applying E to g⊥ is equivalent to taking the
dot product of R and g⊥, which is zero. Eg is a polynomial in x with degree
at most M (as R (x, y) is such, and as Eg =
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) g (y)dy is an integral
with respect to y), and f⊥ is orthogonal to that, so the second term is zero
also. Thus, f · (Eg) = f|| ·
(
Eg||
)
.
Decompose f according to an orthonormal basis {f0, f1, · · ·fM}, and
decompose g according to an orthonormal basis {g0, g1, · · · gM}. Then, if
f = fsx for some sx ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M} and g = gsy for some sy ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M},
then the equation (f ·(Eg) equaling the expression) holds. Thus, using linear
combinations, the equation holds for f = f|| and g = g||, because both sides
are linear in f and in g. However, for all s ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M}, f⊥ · fs = 0 and
g⊥ · gs = g|| · gs, so, for f = f⊥ or g = g⊥, both sides of the equation are zero,
so it holds again. Thus, again using linear combinations, the equation holds
for f in general.
Proof.
Eg =
n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) g (y) dy
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
))
g (y) dy
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
− (x− y) + a
2
))
g (y) dy
a
2
being a constant, it follows that r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+r
(− (x− y) + a
2
)
is a poly-
nomial in x−y with degree not more thanN . Let P (x− y) = r (x− y + a
2
)
+
r
(− (x− y) + a
2
)
, and let M be the degree of P . This means that M is a
nonnegative integer not greater than N . Thus, R (x, y) = P (x− y).
Decompose g into g|| + g⊥, such that g|| is a polynomial with degree at
most M , and g⊥ is orthogonal to all polynomials with degree at most M
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(which can be done in exactly one way, by Lemma 3). Also decompose f
into f|| + f⊥. Then:
f · (Eg) = f ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g (y) dy


= f ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) (g|| (y) + g⊥ (y)) dy


= f ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy +
n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g⊥ (y)dy


P is a polynomial in x−y with degree at most M , which means that, regard-
less of the value of x, g⊥ is orthogonal to P . That means that
n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g⊥ (y) dy =
0 for all values of x (in
[−n
2
, n
2
]
). Thus:
f · (Eg) = f ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy +
n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g⊥ (y)dy


= f ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy


=
(
f|| + f⊥
) ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy


= f|| ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y)dy

 + f⊥ ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy


As f⊥ is orthogonal to all polynomials in x of degree not more than N , and
as
n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y)dy is itself a polynomial in x of degree not more than
M , this means that f⊥ ·
(
n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy
)
= 0. Thus:
f · (Eg) = f|| ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y)dy

 + f⊥ ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y) dy


= f|| ·


n
2∫
−n
2
P (x− y) g|| (y)dy


= f|| ·


n
2∫
−n
2
R (x, y) g|| (y) dy


= f|| ·
(
Eg||
)
As the polynomials in x (defined on
[−n+a
2
, n+a
2
]
) with degree not more than
M constitute an (M + 1)-dimensional space, they have a basis with M + 1
elements (for example,
{
1, x, x2, ..., xM
}
). Moreover, applying the Gram-
Schmidt construction guarantees the existence of an orthonormal basis of
the polynomials of degree not more than M , and this basis still has M + 1
elements. Let {f0, f1, f2, ..., fM} be this orthonormal basis, or any other or-
thonormal basis. The polynomials in y (defined on
[−n
2
, n
2
]
) with degree
not more than M have a different orthonormal basis, {g0, g1, g2, ..., gM}. Us-
ing these orthonormal bases, f|| decomposes as
M∑
sx=0
(
f|| · fsx
)
fsx (as can be
checked by computing the dot products of each fsx with both f|| and its
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decomposition). Similarly, g|| decomposes as
M∑
sy=0
(
g|| · gsy
)
gsy . Thus:
f · (Eg) = f|| ·
(
Eg||
)
=
(
M∑
sx=0
(
f|| · fsx
)
fsx
)
·

E

 M∑
sy=0
(
g|| · gsy
)
gsy




=
(
M∑
sx=0
(
f|| · fsx
)
fsx
)
·

 M∑
sy=0
(
g|| · gsy
) (
Egsy
)
=
M∑
sx=0

((f|| · fsx) fsx) ·

 M∑
sy=0
(
g|| · gsy
) (
Egsy
)


=
M∑
sx=0

 M∑
sy=0
(
g|| · gsy
) (((
f|| · fsx
)
fsx
) · (Egsy))


=
M∑
sx=0
M∑
sy=0
((
f|| · fsx
) (
g|| · gsy
) (
(fsx) ·
(
Egsy
)))
As f0, f1, f2, · · · , fM are all polynomials with degree at most M , and as
f⊥ is orthogonal to all polynomials with degree at most M , it follows that
f⊥ · fsx = 0. Thus,
f · fsx =
(
f|| + f⊥
) · fsx
=
(
f|| · fsx
)
+ (f⊥ · fsx)
=
(
f|| · fsx
)
+ 0
= f|| · fsx
For the same reason, g · gsy = g|| · gsy . Thus:
f · (Eg) =
M∑
sx=0
M∑
sy=0
((
f|| · fsx
) (
g|| · gsy
) (
(fsx) ·
(
Egsy
)))
=
M∑
sx=0
M∑
sy=0
(
(f · fsx)
(
g · gsy
) (
(fsx) ·
(
Egsy
)))
=
(
f · f0 · · · f · fM
) f0 · (Eg0) · · · f0 · (EgM)· · · · · · · · ·
fM · (Eg0) · · · fM · (EgM)



 g · g0· · ·
g · gM


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This is the equality claimed in this lemma. Also, indeed, f0, f1, · · · , fM are
orthonormal and are all polynomials with degree not greater than M (as
they were defined to be this way), and where g0, g1, · · · , gM are orthonormal
and are all polynomials with degree not greater than M (again, as they were
defined to be this way).
Lemma 5. Let v1, ..., vN+2 be points in ℜN . Then, if v is a convex combi-
nation of these points, v can also be expressed as a convex combination of at
most N + 1 of them, not necessarily the same ones for every choice of v.
Proof sketch. Consider v as a convex combination of exactly N+2 points,
v1, v2, ..., and vN+2. The differences between the N + 2 points span a space
of no more than N dimensions, so N differences suffice to span this space.
That allows one of v2− v1, v3− v1, ...,and vN+2− v1 to be expressed in terms
of the rest, or, equivalently, allows 0 to be a linear combination of these
differences. Add this alternative way of representing 0 to v, which leaves
the sum of the coefficients untouched (because each difference has 0 as its
sum of coefficients). In fact, the same is true for adding any multiple of
this representation of 0 to v. Some multiples will keep all the coefficients
nonnegative; some will not. Small multiples will keep all the coefficients
nonnegative (unless one was zero to begin with, but then that term can just
be removed). Find the edges of region (of multiples of the zero) that keep
all the coefficients nonnegative. On either edge of the region, one or more
coefficients is zero, and the rest are nonnegative. Now remove whichever
terms have the zero coefficient, and the result is a convex combination of
N + 1 points or fewer.
Proof. Let v =
N+2∑
s=1
csvs, where
N+2∑
s=1
cs = 1 and 0 ≤ cs ≤ 1 for all s ∈
{1, 2, ..., N + 2} (in other words, v is a convex combination of the vs). If v1
is not the zero vector, then subtract v1 from all the vs (including v1 itself)
and also from v, and if v was a convex combination of the vs, then it is still
a convex combination of the vs, with the same choices of cs; conversely, if v
is now a convex combination of the vs, it was a convex combination of the
vs, again with the same choices of cs.
Let S be the space spanned by the vs; this may or may not be ℜN .
Regardless, it is possible to select N vectors from the vs that span S. Add
v1 to this set (or if v1 is already in, add another of the vs instead). Let vN+2
be the one of the vs that is not in this set; if it is not vN+2, then reassign
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the labels of the vs so that it is indeed vN+2 outside the set (and so that v1
remains 0).
Given that v1, ..., vN+1 span S, it follows that vN+2 =
N+1∑
s=1
dsvs for some
real numbers ds. Equivalently, if dN+2 is set to be −1,
N+2∑
s=1
dsvs = 0. As
v1 = 0, it can be further specified that d1 = −
N+2∑
s=2
ds, so that the sum of all
the ds is zero.
Thus, not only does v =
N+2∑
s=1
csvs, but also, v =
N+2∑
s=1
csvs+b
(
N+2∑
s=1
dsvs
)
=
v for any real number b. Simplifying the right side of this equation yields
v =
N+2∑
s=1
(cs + bds) vs, with
N+2∑
s=1
(cs + bds) =
N+2∑
s=1
cs + b
N+2∑
s=1
ds = 1 + b(0) = 1,
so, provided that all coefficients of
N+2∑
s=1
(cs + bds) vs are nonnegative, this
expression gives a different way to write v as a convex combination of v1, ...,
vN+2.
All that remains is to select a value of b that leaves all coefficients non-
negative, but that sets at least one of them to zero. There is at least one
negative ds (for instance, dN+2). For all s where ds is negative, let t be the
one for which −cs
ds
is lowest, and set b = −ct
dt
. b is a nonnegative number,
because ct ≥ 0. Thus, for any s where ds ≥ 0, cs + bds ≥ 0 is satisfied
automatically. If ds < 0, then cs + bds = cs +
−ct
dt
ds ≥ cs + −csds ds = 0. Thus,
all coefficients are nonnegative. The coefficient with index t is zero, because
ct+bdt = ct+
−ct
dt
dt = 0. Thus, this is a value of b that makes
N+2∑
s=1
(cs + bds) vs
a representation of v as a convex combination of all the v1, ..., vN+2, with at
least one coefficient equal to 0. Remove this term, and the result is a convex
combination of at most N + 1 of v1, ..., vN+2.
Lemma 6. Let v1, ..., vM be points in ℜN , with M > N . Then, if v is
a convex combination of these points, v can also be expressed as a convex
combination of at most N + 1 of them, not necessarily the same ones for
every choice of v.
Proof sketch. For a convex combination of more than N + 2 points,
consider just the first N + 2 points, with rescaled coefficients, so that the
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rescaled coefficients sum to 1. That is a convex combination of N +2 points,
so it can be rewritten as a convex combination of no more than N+1 of those
N + 2 points by the previous lemma. Scale the N + 1 coefficients back, so
that their sum is the same as was the sum of the N + 2 original coefficients,
and replace the part of the convex combination corresponding to the first
N + 2 points with this new expression. That is still a representation of v as
a convex combination of points, but this time, it is a convex combination of
only M −1 points. As long as there are N +2 or more points, this procedure
can remove one, so repeat this procedure until there are only N +1 or fewer
points.
Proof. Let v =
M∑
s=1
csvs, where
M∑
s=1
cs = 1 and 0 ≤ cs ≤ 1 for all s ∈
{1, 2, ...,M} (in other words, v is a convex combination of the vs). Also,
let at least one of c1, c2, ..., cN+2 be nonzero. (Reshuffle the points if neces-
sary to make it so. There is at least one point with a nonzero coefficient.)
Now:
v =
M∑
s=1
csvs
=
(
N+2∑
s=1
csvs
)
+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
=


N+2∑
u=1
cu
N+2∑
u=1
cu


(
N+2∑
s=1
csvs
)
+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
=
(
N+2∑
u=1
cu
)
N+2∑
s=1

 csN+2∑
u=1
cu

 vs

+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
As
N+2∑
s=1

 cs
N+2∑
u=1
cu

 vs is a convex combination of v1, ..., vN+2 (as its coefficients
are nonnegative and sum to 1), by Lemma 5,
N+2∑
s=1

 cs
N+2∑
u=1
cu

 vs is a convex
combination of at most N + 1 vectors chosen from v1, ..., vN+2. Let w1,
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..., wN+1 be these N + 1 vectors. Thus, for some nonnegative numbers dt
summing to 1,
N+2∑
s=1

 cs
N+2∑
u=1
cu

 vs = N+1∑
t=1
dtwt. Therefore:
(
N+2∑
u=1
cu
)
N+2∑
s=1

 csN+2∑
u=1
cu

 vs

+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
=
(
N+2∑
u=1
cu
)(
N+1∑
t=1
dtwt
)
+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
=
(
N+1∑
t=1
(
dt
N+2∑
u=1
cu
)
wt
)
+
(
M∑
s=N+3
csvs
)
All the coefficients sum to 1, as in the first sum, the coefficients sum to
N+1∑
t=1
(
dt
N+2∑
u=1
cu
)
=
N+2∑
u=1
cu
N+1∑
t=1
dt =
N+2∑
u=1
cu =
N+2∑
s=1
cs, and in the second term,
the coefficients sum to
M∑
s=N+3
csvs, for an overall sum of
M∑
s=1
csvs, which is
1. Also, all the coefficients are nonnegative (because
N+2∑
s=1
cs is nonnegative).
Thus, this is a convex combination of w1, ..., wN+1, vN+3, ..., vM , and this list
includes only M − 1 vectors. This procedure can be repeated as many times
as needed, to bring the number of vectors down to N +2 (or fewer, in which
case the lemma statement is true); at that point, Lemma 5 (or yet another
run of this procedure, with the sum from N + 3 to M having no terms and
therefore being zero) can be applied for a final reduction to at most N + 1
points.
Lemma 7. Let h be a continuous function from
[−n
2
, n
2
]
to ℜN . Then, if
v =
n
2∫
n
2
f (x) h (x) dx with
n
2∫
n
2
f (x) dx = 1 and f (x) ≥ 0 for all x in [−n
2
, n
2
]
(in other words, v is in the convex hull of the path h), then v is a convex
combination of at most N + 1 values of the range of h (in other words, of at
most N + 1 points on the path h).
Proof sketch. From the previous lemma, it is possible to reduce a convex
combination of finitely many points in an N -dimensional space to a convex
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combination of only N + 1 of those points. For a point v that is the con-
vex combination of infinitely-many points on the path, divide the integral
into M pieces. In each piece, keep f (x) exactly as it was, but approximate
h (x) by h at the left (lowest x) endpoint. As M gets big, these approxi-
mations approach v. Each of the approximations is a convex combination of
finitely many points, so the previous lemma shows that each approximation
is a convex combination of only N + 1 points. Write it this way for each
approximation. Then, at least some of the approximations form a conver-
gent sequence, in that the first points of the convex combinations converge,
as do the second points, and so on until the (N + 1)st points, and so do the
corresponding coefficients. For each point or coefficient, take the limit of the
corresponding point or coefficient in the convergent subsequence, and this
serves as a representation of v as a convex combination of N + 1 points.
Proof. Divide
[−n
2
, n
2
]
intoM equal-size intervals
[−n
2
,−n
2
+ n
M
]
,
[−n
2
+ n
M
,−n
2
+ 2 n
M
]
,
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...,
[−n
2
+ (M − 1) n
M
, n
2
]
. Then,
v =
n
2∫
n
2
f (x) h (x) dx
=
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) h (x) dx
=
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x)

h1 (x)...
hN (x)

 dx
(with h1 (x), ..., hN (x) being the components of h (x))
=
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M

f (x) h1 (x)...
f (x) hN (x)

 dx
=
M−1∑
s=0


−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) h1 (x) dx
...
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) hN (x) dx


=


M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) h1 (x) dx
...
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) hN (x) dx


Let vt =
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (x) dx. In other words, vt is the t-th compo-
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nent of v. Then, because f (x) is nonnegative:
vt =
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (x) dx
≤
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x)
(
max
−n
2
+s n
M
≤b≤−n
2
+(s+1) n
M
ht (b)
)
dx
In other words, if the ht (x) in each interval get increased to the maximum
ht (x) in that interval (which exists because ht is continuous), then vt does
not decrease. A similar statement gives a lower bound to vt:
vt =
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (x) dx
≥
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x)
(
min
−n
2
+s n
M
≤b≤−n
2
+(s+1) n
M
ht (b)
)
dx
Let bs,t,max satisfy −n2 + s nM ≤ b ≤ −n2 + (s+ 1) nM , and be such that
ht (bs,t,max) = max−n
2
+s n
M
≤b≤−n
2
+(s+1) n
M
(ht (b)). In other words, in the maximum
expression, bs,t,max is the b-value achieving that maximum, which exists be-
cause ht is continuous and the maximum is taken over a closed interval.
Similarly, let bs,t,min satisfy −n2 + s nM ≤ b ≤ −n2 + (s+ 1) nM , and be such
that ht (bs,t,min) = min−n
2
+s n
M
≤b≤−n
2
+(s+1) n
M
(ht (b)). Thus:
vt ≤
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,max) dx
and
vt ≥
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,min) dx
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The difference between the bounds is:
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,max) dx−
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,min) dx
=
M−1∑
s=0


−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,max) dx−
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (bs,t,min) dx


=
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
(f (x) ht (bs,t,max)− f (x) ht (bs,t,min)) dx
=
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) (ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min)) dx
Since ht is a continuous function on a closed interval (which is
[−n
2
, n
2
]
), it
is uniformly continuous. Therefore, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a δ > 0, such
that for all x1 and x2 in
[−n
2
, n
2
]
, if |x1 − x2| < δ, then |ht (x1)− ht (x2)| < ǫ.
For each ǫ, select a δ where this is so, and choose any M > n
δ
. For any such
M , −n
2
+s n
M
and −n
2
+(s+ 1) n
M
are only n
M
apart, which is less than n
(nδ )
, or,
equivalently, less than δ. That means that bs,t,min and bs,t,max are less than
δ apart, as they are both in
[−n
2
+ s n
M
,−n
2
+ (s + 1) n
M
]
and the endpoints
of this interval are less than δ apart. Thus, |bs,t,min − bs,t,max| < δ, and thus,
|ht (bs,t,min)− ht (bs,t,max)| < ǫ. Thus, for any ǫ, it is possible, just by setting
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M to be big enough, to set:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) (ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min)) dx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
M−1∑
s=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) (ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min)) dx
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
|f (x) (ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min))| dx
≤
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) |ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min)| dx
≤
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) (ǫ) dx
≤ ǫ
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx
≤ ǫ
n
2∫
−n
2
f (x) dx
≤ ǫ
Thus,
lim
M→∞
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) (ht (bs,t,max)− ht (bs,t,min)) dx = 0
which means that the bounds on vt approach each other. Therefore, both
bounds, as well as anything always at or between them, must converge to vt.
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One thing guaranteed to be at or between the bounds is the left sum for
vt =
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) ht (x) dx
which is
M−1∑
s=0

(ht (−n
2
+ s
n
M
)) −n2 +(s+1) nM∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx


Recombining these left sums gives:

M−1∑
s=0
((
h1
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)) −n2+(s+1) nM∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx
)
...
M−1∑
s=0
((
hN
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)) −n2+(s+1) nM∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx
)


=
M−1∑
s=0


(
h1
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)) −n2+(s+1) nM∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx
...(
hN
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)) −n2+(s+1) nM∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx


=
M−1∑
s=0


−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx

h1
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)
...
hN
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)




=
M−1∑
s=0




−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx

h(−n
2
+ s
n
M
)
This is actually a convex combination of the h
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)
, as the coefficients
of the h
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)
are
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx, which are all nonnegative, and
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which sum to:
M−1∑
s=0
−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx
=
n
2∫
−n
2
f (x) dx
= 1
As such, by Lemma 6, the left sum for v (which is
M−1∑
s=0




−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx

 h(−n
2
+ s
n
M
)
) is a convex combination of at most N+1 of the h
(−n
2
+ s n
M
)
. If it has fewer
than N+1 points, add more points to it with coefficient 0 to make it a convex
combination of exactly N +1 points.Equivalently, for some nonnegative cq,M
(where q goes from 1 to N+1) that sum to 1, and where the xq,M are selected
from the −n
2
+ s n
M
(for the same M),
M−1∑
s=0




−n
2
+(s+1) n
M∫
−n
2
+s n
M
f (x) dx

h(−n
2
+ s
n
M
) = N+1∑
q=1
(cq,Mh (xq,M))
Also, as M gets large, the left sum for v approaches v, because each of its
components was already shown to approach the corresponding component of
v. Therefore,
lim
M→∞
N+1∑
q=1
(cq,Mh (xq,M)) = v
The sequence of vectors 



c1,M
...
cN+1,M
x1,M
...
xN+1,M




has a convergent (in all components) subsequence. The reason for that is
that there is a subsequence where the first components converge (the first
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components being bounded), and from there, there is a sub-subsequence
where the second components converge, and this process can be repeated
for each component. Let {Mp}∞p=1 be the choices of M in this convergent
subsequence. That means that all the lim
p→∞
cq,Mp and all the lim
p→∞
xq,Mp exist.
As such, the expression,
N+1∑
q=1

 limp→∞ cq,Mp


h1
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)




has no non-existent limits in it, so it can be simplified using the usual rules
for limits to
lim
p→∞
N+1∑
q=1

cq,Mp

h1
(
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
xq,Mp
)




which is
lim
p→∞
N+1∑
q=1
(
cq,Mph
(
xq,Mp
))
Given that it is already known that
lim
M→∞
N+1∑
q=1
(cq,Mh (xq,M)) = v
it follows that
lim
p→∞
N+1∑
q=1
(
cq,Mph
(
xq,Mp
))
= v
This means that
v =
N+1∑
q=1

 limp→∞ cq,Mp


h1
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)




As long as each (as q varies)

h1
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)


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is a point on the path h, this is a representation of v as a convex combination
of at most N + 1 points on the path h, as the cq,Mp sum to 1, and thus so
do their limits as p approaches infinity, and as the cq,Mp are all nonnegative,
and thus so are their limits as p approaches infinity.
Indeed, since all the ht are continuous, it follows that

h1
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)

 = h
(
lim
p→∞
(
xq,Mp
))
The limit lim
p→∞
(
xq,Mp
)
exists (since theMp were selected to make it exist) and
is in
[−n
2
, n
2
]
(since all the
(
xq,Mp
)
are in that interval), so


h1
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)
...
hN
(
lim
p→∞
xq,Mp
)


is indeed on the path h. Thus, v indeed is a convex combination of at most
N + 1 points on the path h.
Lemma 8. For any function h, let h− be the function defined as h− (z) =
h (−z). Then, (Eg)− = E (g−). In other words, if g were graphed with y
on the horizontal axis, and if Eg were graphed with x on the horizontal axis,
then, a reflection of g across the vertical axis causes Eg to likewise reflect
across the vertical axis.
Proof.
(E (g−)) (x) =
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
))
g− (y) dy
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
))
g (−y) dy
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Substituting u = −y:
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
))
g (−y) dy
= −
−n
2∫
n
2
(
r
(
x+ u+
a
2
)
+ r
(
−x− u+ a
2
))
g (u) du
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
x+ u+
a
2
)
+ r
(
−x− u+ a
2
))
g (u) du
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− u+ a
2
)
+ r
(
x+ u+
a
2
))
g (u) du
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− u+ a
2
)
+ r
(
− (−x) + u+ a
2
))
g (u) du
As the choice of the letter used for the variable of integration does not matter:
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− u+ a
2
)
+ r
(
− (−x) + u+ a
2
))
g (u) du
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
− (−x) + y + a
2
))
g (y)du
Thus:
(E (g−)) (x) =
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
− (−x) + y + a
2
))
g (y)du
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Also:(
(Eg)−
)
(x) = (Eg) (−x)
=
n
2∫
−n
2
(
r
(
−x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
− (−x) + y + a
2
))
g (y) du
This implies that (Eg)− = E (g−), as these two functions of x agree on every
value of x.
Lemma 9 (Effect on E on even and odd parts of g). For all functions h, let
he =
h+h
−
2
and ho (z) =
h−h
−
2
, with h− (z) = h (−z), as defined in Lemma 8.
(In other words, he is the ”even part” of h, and ho is the ”odd part” of h.)
Then, (Eg)e = E (ge) and (Eg)o = E (go).
Proof.
(Eg)e =
Eg + (Eg)−
2
=
Eg + E (g−)
2
=
E (g + g−)
2
= E
(
g + g−
2
)
= E (ge)
and, similarly:
(Eg)o =
Eg − (Eg)−
2
=
Eg − E (g−)
2
=
E (g − g−)
2
= E
(
g − g−
2
)
= E (go)
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Lemma 10. The orthonormal basis of Player 1’s strategies {f0 (x) , f1 (x) , f2 (x) , · · · }
contains only even functions and odd functions. Likewise, the orthonormal
basis of Player 1’s strategies {g0 (y) , g1 (y) , g2 (y) , · · · } also contains only
even functions and odd functions.
Proof. Let w be x for Player 1 or y for Player 2, let ν be n+a
2
for Player 1
or n
2
for Player 2, and for all nonnegative integers s, let hs be fs for Player
1 or gs for Player 2. In either case, to prove this lemma, it suffices to show
that the orthonormal basis {h0 (w) , h1 (w) , h2 (w) , · · · } contains only even
functions and odd functions. For either player, this is the orthonormal (using
the dot product ha · hb =
ν∫
−ν
ha (x) hb (x) dx) basis generated from the basis
{1, w, w2, · · · , wn} by the Gram-Schmidt process.
Suppose that this is not the case; that is, suppose that, for some nonneg-
ative integer s, hs is neither even nor odd. Of all the s, where hs is neither
even nor odd, choose the lowest. s is not 0, because h0 =
1√
1·1 is an even
function. For s > 0,
hs =
ws −
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj)hj)√√√√(ws − s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj) hj)
)
·
(
ws −
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj)hj)
)
(obtained by reducing ws to its component perpendicular to all of h0, h1, h2, · · · , hs−1,
and by normalizing the result by dividing by the magnitude). This is defined,
because, for every polynomial h, h · h =
ν∫
−ν
(hj (w))
2
dw ≥ 0, and is only zero
when h is the zero polynomial; ws −
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj)hj) is not the zero polyno-
mial, or else ws is a linear combination of h0, h1, · · ·hs−1, or, equivalently, a
linear combination of 1, w, w2, · · · , ws−1, but this is not the case.
Now, each hj is either an even function or an odd function, as is w
s. If
exactly one of ws and hj is an even function (the other one being odd), then
ws · hj =
ν∫
−ν
wshj (w) dw = 0, as this is the integral of an odd function over
a symmetric interval. Thus, for the sum
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj) hj), if ws is even, then
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every term in this sum is even14, and, similarly, if ws is odd, then every term
in this sum is odd. It follows that ws −
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj) hj) itself is either an
even function or an odd function, but hs is w
s −
s−1∑
j=0
((ws · hj) hj) divided
by a (nonzero) constant, so hs is either even or odd, which contradicts the
assumption.
From the contrary assumption leading to a contradiction, the orthonor-
mal basis {h0 (w) , h1 (w) , h2 (w) , · · · } contains only even functions and odd
functions. It thus follows that the orthonormal basis of Player 1’s strategies
{f0 (x) , f1 (x) , f2 (x) , · · · } contains only even functions and odd functions,
and that the orthonormal basis of Player 1’s strategies {g0 (y) , g1 (y) , g2 (y) , · · · }
also contains only even functions and odd functions.
Lemma 11. If f and g are functions, then fo · (Ege) = 0, and similarly,
fe · (Ego) = 0 (where the subscripts e and o are as defined in Lemma 9).
Proof.
fo · (Ege) = fo · ((Eg)e) (by Lemma 9)
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
fo (x) (Eg)e (x) dx
This is an integral of an odd function (as fo (x) (Eg)e, being the product of
an odd function and an even function, is odd) over a symmetric interval, and,
therefore, it is zero. Similarly:
fe · (Ego) = fe · ((Eg)o) (by Lemma 9)
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
fe (x) (Eg)o (x) dx
This is an integral of an odd function (as fe (x) (Eg)o, being the product of
an even function and an odd function, is odd) over a symmetric interval, and,
therefore, it is zero.
14Each hj is either even or odd; if hj is even, then (w
s · hj)hj is even, being a constant
multiple of hj ; if hj is odd, then (w
s · hj)hj = 0hj = 0 is also an even function.
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Lemma 12 (Even-function equilibrium). If Player 1 playing strategy f and
Player 2 playing strategy g is a Nash equilibrium, then so is Player 1 playing
strategy fe and Player 2 playing strategy ge.
Proof. Let f and g be strategies that can be played (f by Player 1 and g by
Player 2); that is, let
n
2∫
n
2
f (x) dx = 1 and
n
2∫
n
2
g (y)dx = 1, and let f and g be
nonnegative on their domains: f on
[−n+a
2
, n+a
2
]
, and g on
[−n
2
, n
2
]
. First,
it is indeed possible for Player 1 to play strategy fe, as:
1 =
n+a
2∫
n+a
2
f (x) dx
=
n+a
2∫
n+a
2
fe (x) + fo (x) dx
=
n+a
2∫
n+a
2
fe (x) dx+
n
2∫
n
2
fo (x) dx
=
n+a
2∫
n+a
2
fe (x) dx+ 0 as fo is an odd function
=
n+a
2∫
n+a
2
fe (x) dx
and as:
fe (x) =
f (x) + f− (x)
2
=
f (x)
2
+
f− (x)
2
=
f (x)
2
+
f (−x)
2
≥ 0
2
+
0
2
(as f (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈
[
−n + a
2
,
n+ a
2
]
)
= 0
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It is also possible for Player 2 to play strategy ge, for the same reason. As
fo · (Ege) = 0 (by Lemma 11), it follows that:
f · (Ege) = (fe + fo) · (Ege)
= (fe · (Ege)) + (fo · (Ege))
= fe · (Ege) + 0
= fe · (Ege)
Similarly, as fe · (Ego) = 0 (by Lemma 11), it follows that:
fe · (Eg) = f · (E (ge + go))
= f · (Ege + Ego)
= (f · (Ege)) + (f · (Ego))
= fe · (Ege) + 0
= fe · (Ege)
Let f by Player 1 and g by Player 2 now be a Nash equilibrium. Thus, by
definition of the Nash equilibrium:
f · (Eg) ≥ fe · (Eg)
= fe · (Ege)
= f · (Ege)
≥ f · (Eg)
which makes all these quantities equal: f · (Eg), fe · (Eg), fe · (Ege), and
f · (Ege). As shown earlier, it is also the case that fe · (Eg), fe · (Ege),
and f · (Ege) (but not necessarily f · (Eg)) would be equal even without
the assumption that f by Player 1 and g by Player 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
Now, let Player 1 play strategy fe, and let Player 2 play strategy ge. Then,
if Player 1 modifies Player 1’s strategy to f˜ , the result is f˜ · (Ege). Then:
f˜ · (Ege) =
(
f˜
)
e
· (Ege) where
(
f˜
)
e
is the even part of f˜
=
(
f˜
)
e
· (Eg)
≤ f · (Eg) (as f by Player 1 and g by Player 2 is a Nash equilibrium)
= fe · (Ege)
That means that Player 1 cannot benefit from modifying strategy fe while
Player 2 plays strategy ge. If, instead, Player 2 modifies Player 2’s strategy
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to g˜, the result is fe · (Eg˜). Then:
fe · (Eg˜) = fe · (E (g˜)e) where (g˜)e is the even part of g˜
= f · (E (g˜)e)
≥ f · (Eg) (as f by Player 1 and g by Player 2 is a Nash equilibrium)
= fe · (Ege)
That means that Player 2 cannot benefit from modifying strategy ge while
Player 1 plays strategy fe. Therefore, fe by Player 1 and ge by Player 2 is a
Nash equilibrium.
8 Appendix 2: Calculations
Calculation 1. If r (z) = −z3, then:
R (x, y)
= r
(
x− y + a
2
)
+ r
(
−x+ y + a
2
)
= −
(
x− y + a
2
)3
−
(
−x + y + a
2
)3
= − (x− y)3 − 3 (x− y)2
(a
2
)
− 3 (x− y)
(a
2
)2
−
(a
2
)3
− (−x+ y)3 − 3 (−x+ y)2
(a
2
)
− 3 (−x+ y)
(a
2
)2
−
(a
2
)3
= −6 (x− y)2
(a
2
)
− 2
(a
2
)3
Calculation 2. If R (x, y) = − (x− y)2, then this calculation shows that if
g is orthogonal to 1, y, and y2 (which means that
n
2∫
−n
2
g (y) dy,
n
2∫
−n
2
yg (y)dy,
and
n
2∫
−n
2
y2g (y)dy are all zero), or if f is orthogonal to 1, x, and x2 (which
means that
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) dx,
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
xg (x) dx, and
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
x2g (x) dx are all zero)
then f · (Eg) = 0.
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If g is orthogonal to all of 1, y, and y2:
Eg =
n
2∫
−n
2
− (x− y)2 g (y) dy
=
n
2∫
−n
2
− (x2 − 2xy + y2) g (y)dy
= −x2
n
2∫
−n
2
− (1) g (y) dy + 2x
n
2∫
−n
2
− (y) g (y) dy −
n
2∫
−n
2
− (y2) g (y) dy
= −x2 (0) + 2x (0)− (0)
= 0
Thus, if g is orthogonal to 1, to y, and to y2, then Eg = 0. This automatically
implies that f · (Eg) =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) 0dx = 0.
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If, instead, f is orthogonal to all of 1, x, and x2:
f · (Eg) =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
(− (x− y)2) f (x) g (y) dy dx
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
(−x2 + 2xy − y2) f (x) g (y) dy dx
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
n
2∫
−n
2
(−x2f (x) + 2xf (x) y − y2f (x)) g (y)dy dx
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2

(x2f (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
−g (y) dy + (xf (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
2yg (y)dy + (f (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
−y2g (y) dy

 dx
=
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2

(x2f (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
−g (y) dy

 dx+
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2

(xf (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
2yg (y) dy

 dx
+
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2

(f (x))
n
2∫
−n
2
−y2g (y) dy

 dx
=


n
2∫
−n
2
−g (y)dy


n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
x2f (x) dx+


n
2∫
−n
2
2yg (y)dy


n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
xf (x) dx
+


n
2∫
−n
2
−y2g (y)dy


n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) dx
= 0
The last step is valid, because the x-integrals are all zero, because of the
orthogonality of f (x) to 1, x, and x2. Thus, if f is orthogonal to 1, to x,
and to x2, then f · (Eg) =
n+a
2∫
−n+a
2
f (x) 0dx = 0.
Calculation 3. From the polynomials 1, x, x2, · · · , an orthonormal basis can
be constructed by using the Gram-Schmidt process. This process is the same
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for both players, but the results are different, because the dot products are
different for both players. The letter ν should be interpreted as n+a
2
for Player
1 and n
2
for Player 2. Thus, for both players, h1 · h2 =
ν∫
−ν
h1 (x) h2 (x) dx.
To ease computation:
xA · xB =
ν∫
−ν
xAxBdx
=
ν∫
−ν
xA+Bdx
=
νA+B+1
A +B + 1
− −ν
A+B+1
A +B + 1
=
νA+B+1
A +B + 1
(
1− (−1)A+B+1
)
=
νA+B+1
A +B + 1
(
1−
({
1, A+B + 1 is even
−1, A+B + 1 is odd
))
=
νA+B+1
A +B + 1
({
0, A+B + 1 is even
2, A+B + 1 is odd
)
Thus, if A + B is even (so A + B + 1 is odd), xA · xB = ( 2
A+B+1
)
νA+B+1,
while, if A+B is odd (so A+B + 1 is even), xA · xB = 0.
The first (non-normalized) vector of the basis is 1. The second vector of
the basis is x − (x·1
1·1
)
1, which is the component of x orthogonal to 1. As
x · 1 = x · x0 = 0, this is just x.
The third vector is x2 −
(
x2·1
1·1
)
1−
(
x2·x
x·x
)
x, which is orthogonal to both
1 and x.
x2 −
(
x2 · 1
1 · 1
)
1−
(
x2 · x
x · x
)
x = x2 −
((
2
2+0+1
)
ν2+0+1(
2
0+0+1
)
ν0+0+1
)
1−
(
0(
2
1+1+1
)
ν1+1+1
)
x
= x2 −
((
2
3
)
ν3
2ν
)
1−
(
0(
2
3
)
ν3
)
x
= x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
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Thus, the third vector is x2 − (1
3
)
ν2. The fourth vector is: (again, to be
orthogonal to 1, x, and x2 − (1
3
)
ν2)
x3 −
(
x3 · 1
1 · 1
)
1−
(
x3 · x
x · x
)
x−
(
x3 · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
= x3 −
(
0(
2
1
)
ν1
)
1−
((
2
5
)
ν5(
2
3
)
ν3
)
x−
(
x3 · x2 − x3 · ((1
3
)
ν2
)(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
= x3 −
((
3
5
)
ν2
)
x−
(
0− 0 ((1
3
)
ν2
)(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
= x3 −
((
3
5
)
ν2
)
x
(since the dot product of a nonzero with itself is the integral of the square of
a nonzero polynomial, and hence is itself nonzero). Thus, the fourth vector
is x3 − ((3
5
)
ν2
)
x. The fifth vector is (to be orthogonal to the first four):
x4 −
(
x4 · 1
1 · 1
)
1−
(
x4 · x
x · x
)
x−
(
x4 · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
−
(
x4 · (x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
)(
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
) · (x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
)
)(
x3 −
(
3
5
)
ν2x
)
= x4 −
((
2
5
)
ν5(
2
1
)
ν1
)
1−
(
0
x · x
)
x−
(
x4 · x2 − (1
3
)
ν2 (x4 · 1)(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
−
(
x4 · x3 − (3
5
)
ν2 (x4 · x)(
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
) · (x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
)
)(
x3 −
(
3
5
)
ν2x
)
= x4 −
(
1
5
)
ν4 −
( (
2
7
)
ν7 − ((1
3
)
ν2
) ((
2
5
)
ν5
)
x2 · x2 − 2 ((1
3
)
ν2
)
(x2 · 1) + ((1
3
)
ν2
)2
(1 · 1)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
−
(
0− (3
5
)
ν2 (0)(
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
) · (x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
)
)(
x3 −
(
3
5
)
ν2x
)
= x4 −
(
1
5
)
ν4 −
( (
2
7
)
ν7 − ( 2
15
)
ν7(
2
5
)
ν5 − 2 ((1
3
)
ν2
) ((
2
3
)
ν3
)
+
((
1
3
)
ν2
)2 ((2
1
)
ν1
)
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
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This simplifies to:
x4 −
(
1
5
)
ν4 −
((
16
105
)
ν7(
8
45
)
ν5
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
= x4 −
(
1
5
)
ν4 −
((
6
7
)
ν2
)(
x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2
)
= x4 −
(
1
5
)
ν4 −
(
6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
2
7
)
ν4
= x4 −
(
6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4
Thus, the first five non-normalized vectors are 1, x, x2−(1
3
)
ν2, x3−(3
5
)
ν2x,
and x4−(6
7
)
ν2x2+
(
3
35
)
ν4. Normalizing them requires dividing each of them
by its magnitude. Thus, the first vector is:
1√
1 · 1 =
1√(
2
1
)
ν1
=
(√
1
2
)
ν−
1
2
The second vector is:
x√
x · x =
x√(
2
3
)
ν3
=
(√
3
2
)
ν−
3
2x
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The third vector is:
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2√(
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) · (x2 − (1
3
)
ν2
) = x2 −
(
1
3
)
ν2√
x2 · x2 − 2 ((1
3
)
ν2
)
(x2 · 1) + ((1
3
)
ν2
)2
(1 · 1)
=
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2√(
2
5
)
ν5 − 2 ((1
3
)
ν2
) ((
2
3
)
ν3
)
+
((
1
3
)
ν2
)2 ((2
1
)
ν1
)
=
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2√(
2
5
)
ν5 − (4
9
)
ν5 +
(
2
9
)
ν5
=
x2 − (1
3
)
ν2√(
8
45
)
ν5
=
(√
45
8
)
ν−
5
2x2 −
(√
5
8
)
ν−
1
2
The fourth vector is:
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x√(
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
) · (x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x
) = x3 −
(
3
5
)
ν2x√
x3 · x3 − 2 ((3
5
)
ν2
)
(x3 · x) + ((3
5
)
ν2
)2
(x · x)
=
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x√(
2
7
)
ν7 − 2 ((3
5
)
ν2
) ((
2
5
)
ν5
)
+
((
3
5
)
ν2
)2 ((2
3
)
ν3
)
=
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x√(
2
7
)
ν7 − (12
25
)
ν7 +
(
6
25
)
ν7
=
x3 − (3
5
)
ν2x√(
8
175
)
ν7
=
(√
175
8
)
ν−
7
2x3 −
(√
63
8
)
ν−
3
2x
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The fifth vector is:
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4√(
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4
) · (x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4
)
=
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4√√√√√√√
x4 · x4 − 2
((
6
7
)
ν2
)(
x4 · x2)+ 2(( 3
35
)
ν4
)(
x4 · 1)
+
((
6
7
)
ν2
)2 (
x2 · x2)− 2((6
7
)
ν2
)((
3
35
)
ν4
)(
x2 · 1)+ (( 3
35
)
ν4
)2
(1 · 1)
=
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4√√√√√√√√
(
2
9
)
ν9 − 2
((
6
7
)
ν2
)((
2
7
)
ν7
)
+ 2
((
3
35
)
ν4
)((
2
5
)
ν5
)
+
((
6
7
)
ν2
)2((
2
5
)
ν5
)
− 2
((
6
7
)
ν2
)((
3
35
)
ν4
)((
2
3
)
ν3
)
+
((
3
35
)
ν4
)2((
2
1
)
ν1
)
This simplifies to:
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4√(
2
9
)
ν9 − (24
49
)
ν9 +
(
12
175
)
ν9 +
(
72
245
)
ν9 − ( 24
245
)
ν9 +
(
18
1225
)
ν9
=
x4 − (6
7
)
ν2x2 +
(
3
35
)
ν4√(
128
11025
)
ν9
=
(√
11025
128
)
ν−
9
2x4 −
(√
2025
32
)
ν−
5
2x2 +
(√
81
128
)
ν−
1
2
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Thus, the first five orthonormal polynomials are:(√
1
2
)
ν−
1
2
(√
3
2
)
ν−
3
2x
(√
45
8
)
ν−
5
2x2 −
(√
5
8
)
ν−
1
2
(√
175
8
)
ν−
7
2x3 −
(√
63
8
)
ν−
3
2x
(√
11025
128
)
ν−
9
2x4 −
(√
2025
32
)
ν−
5
2x2 +
(√
81
128
)
ν−
1
2
(where ν is n+a
2
for Player 1 and n
2
for Player 2).
Calculation 4. The pure strategy with x = t, with t ∈ [−ν, ν], where ν is n+a
2
for Player 1 and n
2
for Player 2, is represented by the Dirac delta “function”
δ (x− t). For any function h, the following holds:
δ (x− t) · h =
ν∫
−ν
δ (x− t) h (x) dx
=
ν∫
−ν
δ (x− t) h (t) dx
= h (t)
ν∫
−ν
δ (x− t) dx
= (h (t)) (1)
= h (t)
This means that the pure strategies for either player in the new coordinates
are

f1 (t)f2 (t)
f3 (t)

 for Player 1 and

g1 (t)g2 (t)
g3 (t)

 for Player 2, which, equivalently, are


(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 3
2 t(√
45
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2


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for Player 1 and 

(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n
2
)− 3
2 t(√
45
8
) (
n
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2


for Player 2.
Calculation 5. The curve

(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 3
2 t(√
45
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2


of Player 1’s pure strategies is symmetrical over the plane x2 = 0. That is,
if (x1, x2, x3) is on the curve, then so is (x1,−x2, x3), which can be reached
simply by switching the sign of t. It follows that the convex hull of this
curve is also symmetric over the plane x2 = 0, for the same reason: in
any convex combination of pure strategies, switching the sign of t in all the
components switches the sign of the third component, but leaves the other
two components as they were.
Similarly, the convex hull of the curve of Player 2’s pure strategies, which
is the convex hull of the curve

(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2(√
3
2
) (
n
2
)− 3
2 t(√
45
8
) (
n
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2


is symmetrical over the plane y2 = 0.
This means that for every choice of f · f0 and f · f2 Player 1 can make,
Player 1 can always set f · f1 to be zero without leaving the convex hull, and
a similar statement holds for Player 2.
Player 1’s expected payoff f · (Eg), which is

f · f0f · f1
f · f2


T


(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2
0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 0(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0



g · g0g · g1
g · g2


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can be rewritten as

f · f0f · f2
f · f1


T


(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2 0(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0
0 0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2



g · g0g · g2
g · g1


or as
(
f · f0
f · f2
)T 
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0

(g · g0
g · g2
)
+
(
−4
3
)(
n+ a
2
) 3
2 (n
2
) 3
2
(f · f1) (g · g1)
(as can be verified by carrying out the matrix multiplications). Either player
can set
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 (f · f1) (g · g1) to be zero without affecting the
other term, by setting f · f1 or g · g1 to zero. It follows that in any Nash
equilibrium, Player 1 setting f · f1 to zero, and Player 2 setting g · g1 to zero,
and both players doing this, yield the same expected payoff. Thus, Player
1 setting f · f1 to zero gives no new options to Player 2, as Player 2 could
simply have ”simulated” those options by setting g · g1 to zero. Thus, the
result of both f · f1 and g · g1 being set to zero is another Nash equilibrium.
Thus, Player 1’s strategy space can be reduced to the convex hull of

(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2
0(√
45
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2

, and Player 2’s strategy space can
be reduced to the convex hull of


(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2
0(√
45
8
) (
n
2
)− 5
2 t2 −
(√
5
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2

, with
t going from −n+a
2
to n+a
2
for Player 1 and from −n
2
to n
2
for Player 2, the
interval in which the pure strategies fall. This interval can be cut in half to[
0, n+a
2
]
for Player 1 and to
[
0, n
2
]
for Player 2, because the negative values of
t contribute no points to either curve that were not already contributed by a
positive value of t, and thus they contribute no new points to the convex hull
of that curve. This makes t2 a bijective function, so Tx =
(
n+a
2
)−2
t2 for Player
1 and Ty =
(
n
2
)−2
t2 can serve as the parameters for these curves. Both Tx and
Ty are in [0, 1]. In terms of Tx, Player 1’s strategy space can be reduced to the
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convex hull of


(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2
0(√
45
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2Tx −
(√
5
8
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2

, and Player 2’s strat-
egy space can be reduced to the convex hull of


(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2
0(√
45
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2Ty −
(√
5
8
) (
n
2
)− 1
2

.
These are line segments (although they would not be line segments if r were
of higher degree than 3), so they are their own convex hulls.
After factoring, these segments become
(√
1
2
) (
n+a
2
)− 1
2


1
0(√
45
4
)
Tx −
√
5
4


for Player 1 and
(√
1
2
) (
n
2
)− 1
2


1
0(√
45
4
)
Ty −
√
5
4

 for Player 2.
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As these reduced spaces are in the new coordinates, Player 1’s payoff is
(√
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2


1
0(√
45
4
)
Tx −
√
5
4


T
∗


(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2
0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 0(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0


∗


(√
1
2
)(n
2
)− 1
2


1
0(√
45
4
)
Ty −
√
5
4




=
(
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2(n
2
)− 1
2


1
0(√
45
4
)
Tx −
√
5
4


T
∗


(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 +
(−2
3
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0
(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 1
2
(
n
2
) 5
2
0
(−4
3
) (
n+a
2
) 3
2
(
n
2
) 3
2 0(
−4
√
5
15
) (
n+a
2
) 5
2
(
n
2
) 1
2 0 0


∗


1
0(√
45
4
)
Ty −
√
5
4


=
(
1
2
)(
n+ a
2
)− 1
2(n
2
)− 1
2


((
−2
3
)(
n + a
2
) 5
2 (n
2
) 1
2
+
(
−2
3
)(
n+ a
2
) 5
2 (n
2
) 1
2
)
(1) (1)
+
(
−4
√
5
15
)(
n + a
2
) 5
2 (n
2
) 1
2
((√
45
4
)
Tx −
√
5
4
)
(1)
+
(
−4
√
5
15
)(
n + a
2
) 5
2 (n
2
) 1
2
(1)
((√
45
4
)
Ty −
√
5
4
)


(by multiplying out the matrix product and ignoring any zero entries).
This is a decreasing function in both Tx and Ty, so Player 1 should choose
T = 0 and Player 2 should choose T = 1. Player 1’s choice corresponds to
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t = 0, and hence, to the pure strategy 0. Player 2’s choice corresponds to
t = n
2
, and hence, to the equal mixture of pure stategies n
2
and −n
2
.
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